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ABSTRACT   China’s sustained rapid economic growth over the post-1978 reform era, which 
is also the era of globalisation, is of worldwide importance. This growth experience has been 
based mainly on China’s internal dynamics. In the first half of the era, economic growth was 
propelled by improvement in both allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. From the 
early 1990s until the present time, however, economic growth has been increasingly based on 
dynamic increasing returns associated with a growth path that is characterised by capital 
deepening. In both periods, the growth paths and their associated long-term-oriented 
institutions contradict principles of the free market economy – i.e., doctrines of globalisation. 
In the form of an analytical overview, this article seeks to explain and interpret the historical 
background, logic of evolution, and developmental and social implications of China’s 
economic transformation. The analytics draws on a range of relevant economic theories 
including Marxian theory of economic growth, Post-Keynesian theory of demand 
determination, and Neo-Schumpeterian theory of innovation. It is posited that these 
alternative theoretical perspectives offer better insights than mainstream neoclassical 
economics in explaining and interpreting China’s economic transformation. 
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for correspondence unless otherwise indicated, until July 2007. I wish to thank Perry 
Anderson, Andrea Boltho, Robert Brenner, Alfredo Saad-Filho, Susan Watkins and Zhang Yu 
for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. I am solely responsible for the views 
expressed in the essay, and any errors and mistakes that remain. 
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1. Globalisation Meets the ‘China Paradox’ 
 
Viewed from the perspective of worldwide economic development in the era of globalisation, 
that is, over the past quarter-century, China’s performance could be regarded as unique. The 
country has survived well the three waves of catastrophes that beset the non-Western world 
during this period. These catastrophes, namely, are: first, the ‘lost decades of development’ in 
most parts of the Third World since the early 1980s, second, the total crisis in countries of the 
former Soviet bloc since the mid-1980s, and, finally, the financial and economic crisis that 
engulfed most parts of East Asia in the closing years of the century. 
 What these catastrophes indicate is the transition of world economic development 
from the Golden Age of the 1950-70s to an era of prolonged stagnation since 1980. Along 
with the general stagnation, meanwhile, there has been a trend of growing disparity among 
major regions of the underdeveloped world – that is, a trend of uneven development.1 As can 
be seen from Table 1, prior to the 1980s, the growth performance of most regions was rather 
satisfactory, while that of the newly industrialising economies (represented by South Korea 
and Taiwan in East Asia, and Brazil and Mexico in Latin America) could be considered as 
encouraging. And the record of countries of the former Soviet bloc was in no sense far behind 
the best performers. A totally different picture emerged in the stagnation era, however. The 
                                                           
1 For an analytical overview of the worldwide developmental crisis and uneven development 
after the Golden Age, see Ajit Singh, ‘The actual crisis of economic development in the 
1980s: an alternative policy perspective for the future’ (in A.K. Dutt and K. Jameson [eds.] 
New Directions in Development Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992). John Weeks 
(‘The expansion of capital and uneven development on a world scale’ Capital and Class, 2001, 
no.74, pp.9-30) gives a more theoretical and updated treatment. Dic Lo (‘China after East 
Asian developmentalism’, Historical Materialism, 2001, no.8, pp.253-264) notes several 
structural features of the world economy that have been highlighted in the relevant literature 
as possible main causes of the crisis. Williamson Easterly, ‘The lost decades: developing 
countries’ stagnation in spite of policy reform 1980-1998’ (Working Paper no.27272, The 
World Bank 2001, www.worldbank.org), notes the almost total ignorance of the worldwide 
developmental crisis in the mainstream literature. 
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real growth rate of per capita income for all low-income and middle-income economies was a 
mere 1.3% per annum in the 1980s, and 1.8% in the 1990s. The same rate for all low-income 
economies excluding China and India actually fell sharply, from the already low level of 2.0% 
per annum in the 1960-80s to 1.2% in the 1990s. And the growth performance of middle-
income economies meanwhile has not been any better. Thus, especially when the growing 
disparity across regions is taken into account, it is no exaggeration to call the 1980-90s the 
‘lost decades of development’. This is even more so for countries of the former Soviet bloc, 
where the average annual growth rate of per capita income in the 1990s was -1.7%. 
[Table 1] 
In this context, China’s rapid and sustained economic growth since 1980, over and 
above its respectable record in the previous decades, is indeed unique. As also can be seen 
from Table 1, the country’s per capita income grew at an average rate of 8.8% per annum in 
the 1980s and 9.3% in the 1990s, far exceeding the average of the Asia-Pacific region which 
is the best performer of the world during this period.2 The growth performance is paradoxical 
                                                           
2 The quality of China’s statistical data has invited suspicions, but, in the scholarly literature, 
even the foremost sceptics accept that the actual growth performance over the long term is not 
significantly different from that indicated by official data (Thomas G. Rawski, ‘Measuring 
China’s recent GDP growth: where do we stand?’, www.pitt.edu/~tgrawski, August 2002). 
Recent debates over the matter have centred around the quality of Chinese GDP data in the 
years after 1998. Two arguments put forth by Rawski have been particularly controversial. 
First, in view of the fact that virtually all Chinese provinces have reported their GDP growth 
estimates that are higher than the national average figures, and that China’s statistics system is 
based on vertical reporting, Rawski argues that the reliability of the national figures must also 
be suspected. Second, based on the growth performance of various specific sectors (energy 
consumption, airline usage, etc.), as well as a range of press reports on the behaviour of data 
falsification by local governments, Rawski argues that China’s actual GDP growth rates after 
1998 must be much lower than the official figures. In response to Rawski’s first argument, Xu 
Xianchun (‘Main differences between China’s GDP estimation and the current SNA system 
of GDP estimation’, Jingji Yanjiu [Economic Research Journal], 2001, no.11, and ‘The future 
prospects for China’s economic growth and international economic status’, Jingji Yanjiu 
[Economic Research Journal], 2002, no.3) contends that the National Bureau of Statistics has 
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as well, given that China’s economic institutions and policies have long been dismissed by the 
world orthodox establishment – that is, the Washington establishment and its associated free 
market doctrines – as by nature seriously deviating from the canonical free market economy, 
and being akin to the crisis-causing factors of the three groups of economies indicated in the 
opening paragraph of this article. How, then, has this ‘China paradox’ come about? Does 
there really exit a distinctive, discernible ‘Chinese model of economic transformation’ that 
has underpinned the spectacular developmental performance? 
 
2. China in the Transition Orthodoxy 
 
Talking about ‘the China paradox’, of course, would imply a challenge to the free market 
doctrines, and the orthodox establishment has been outspoken in rejecting it. A recurring 
claim has it that, given a longer time span, an economic collapse of comparable (to the East 
Asian crisis, if not the Russian depression) scale is bound to occur in China, as a punishment 
for its deviation from the established, universal doctrines. 
What the orthodox establishment considers as anomalous, indeed objectionable, in 
China’s reformed economic institutions concerns, ultimately, the widespread violation of the 
principles of individualistic property rights. Easily observable phenomena such as discrete 
                                                                                                                                                                          
developed an increasingly sophisticated system to verify the reliability of data reported by 
lower-level authorities, and has accordingly made the necessary adjustments. In response to 
Rawski’s second argument, in the literature, there have also emerged a range of contending 
views that highlight the fast expansion in imports, the money supply, fiscal revenues and the 
like as being in line with the economic growth performance indicated by official GDP data. It 
is also of importance to note that, following the 2005 Economic Census, in December 2005, 
the Chinese government substantially revised upwards the figures regarding the actual size of 
the country’s GDP as well as its growth rates over the 1990s (for consistency with data of the 
1980s this article does not incorporate the revised data). This contradicts the allegation of 
exaggerated reporting in official statistical data.  On the whole, whilst the indicated debates 
have remained inconclusive, the analysis of this article is unlikely to be significantly affected 
because its focus is on long-term performance. 
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government intervention in economic affairs (the state-business relationship), soft budget 
constraints (the finance-industry relationship) and rigid employment and compensation 
systems (the worker-enterprise relationship) are deemed symptoms of this ultimate disease. 
Thus, in the scholarly circles associated with the orthodox establishment, there has long been 
a proposition stating that China’s reformed economic institutions are a mix of market-
conforming and market-supplanting elements, that its developmental achievements so far 
have been ascribable to the conforming elements whereas the accumulated problems being 
ascribable to the supplanting elements, and that the problems have tended to outweigh the 
achievements as the country’s economic transition proceeding from the allegedly easy phase 
to the difficult phase. The future prospects for the Chinese economy, the proposition 
maintains, is at best uncertain and more likely crisis-prone. And the only way to avoid this 
looming crisis is to embrace the orthodox doctrines in toto, particularly via mass privatisation 
of state firms and liberalisation of external economic transactions.3 
To put the above proposition in context, it should be noted that China’s experience of 
economic development and systemic reform has posed a serious challenge to the orthodox 
doctrines – known variously as ‘market fundamentalism in transition’ (IMF 2000) or ‘the 
transition doctrine of the Washington consensus’ (Stiglitz 1999) – in the so-called transition 
debate. Back in the early 1990s, Martin Weitzman, an influential economist, apparently being 
puzzled, spelt out the following: ‘According to almost any version of standard mainstream 
property rights theory, what has been described as the “East European model” basically 
represents the correct approach to transformation, while what we are calling the “Chinese 
model” should represent a far-out recipe for economic disaster… The central paradox is the 
                                                           
3 Examples of this claim abound, see, e.g., The Economist 24th-30th October 1998, pp.15-16 
and pp.23-28. For a scholarly version of this view, see N.R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished 
Economic Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). See also IMF, 
World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, October 
2000) and the World Bank, Transition – The First Ten Years: Analysis and Lessons for 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), 
for more recent accounts from the orthodox establishment. 
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enormous success of the Chinese model in practice, contrasted with the sputtering, tentative, 
comparatively unsuccessful experience with the East European model.’ 4  The Chinese 
experience appears to indicate that adherence to principles of individualistic property rights is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for generating sustained rapid economic growth – indeed for 
avoiding economic stagnation. The credibility of the orthodox doctrines is thus at risk if not 
having an adequate explanation of the seemingly anomalous Chinese experience. 
In the face of this ‘China challenge’, the orthodox establishment has responded by 
means of relying on the proposition indicated above that focuses on the institutional aspect, as 
well as a second, related proposition on economic development. The World Bank, in its 1996 
World Development Report, which is devoted to the ‘economics of transition’, frames such a 
question for itself to answer: ‘Do differences in transition policies and outcomes reflect 
different reform strategies, or do they reflect primarily country-specific factors such as 
history, the level of development, or, just as important, the impact of political changes taking 
place at the same time?’5 The answer, unsurprisingly, is that differences in country-specific 
factors, particularly the different levels of industrialisation, have largely explained the 
disparity in actual economic performance. Both in China and in countries of the former Soviet 
bloc, the development experiences – sustained rapid growth in the former case, depression in 
the latter case – are largely unrelated to their respective strategies of systemic transformation 
and development policies. Unlike countries of the former Soviet bloc, China was fortunate to 
be with a low level of industrialisation in the beginning of its reform. It has thus been able to 
                                                           
4 Martin Weitzman, ‘Economic transition: can theory help?’ (European Economic Review, 
1993, vol.37, pp.549-555), p.549. Weitzman did not provide a general answer to this question. 
Nevertheless, in a subsequent paper with Chenggang Xu on the acclaimed development of 
China’s collective township and village enterprises (‘Chinese township-village enterprises as 
vaguely defined cooperatives’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1994, vol.18, pp.121-
145), Weitzman raises a proposition – in the spirit of the theories of idiosyncratic exchange 
and incomplete information – which states that vaguely-defined property rights do have 
distinctive competitive advantage under certain structural and institutional conditions. 
5 World Bank, World Development Report (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.5). 
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generate economic growth via labour transfer from the rural-agricultural sector to industry, 
whilst postponing the needed, unavoidably painful reforms.6 
 It should be clear that what underpins both of the two orthodox propositions is the 
notion that economic development is somehow easy or normal – the notion of the so-called 
‘natural path of development’. This does not fare well with the dismal picture of late 
development on the world scale, as depicted above with reference to Table 1. After all, it 
should be noted that China’s growth performance in the era of systemic transformation stands 
in sharp contrast to not only countries of the former Soviet bloc but also most of the non-
Western countries.7 And it is also noted that the initial condition of China’s economic 
transformation is not simply one of under-industrialisation. As can be seen from the figures in 
Table 2, in 1980, industrial value-added accounted for an astonishingly high proportion of 
49% of China’s GDP. This is lower than the Soviet Union (54%), but higher than South 
Korea (40%), Brazil (44%) and India (24%) in the same year. The fact that, despite starting 
with one of the highest industry-to-GDP ratios in the world, China has been able to maintain 
very rapid industrial growth throughout the reform era, and with it to absorb labour transfer 
from the rural-agricultural sector, clearly should not be taken for granted. 
[Table 2] 
                                                           
6 This view was pioneered by Jeffrey Sachs, a leading figure in the army of Western advisers 
to countries of the former Soviet bloc in designing their systemic transformation strategies. 
See Jeffrey Sachs and Wing-Thye Woo, ‘Reform in China and Russia’ (Economic Policy, 
1994, no.18, pp.101-145). 
7 Joseph Stiglitz (‘Whither reform? Ten years of the transition’, keynote address at the Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, April 
1999), then chief economist of the World Bank, was outspoken in criticising this notion of the 
transition orthodoxy. He maintains that China has faced a task of economic transformation 
that must be more difficult than that faced by countries of the former Soviet bloc – because 
China’s task encompasses simultaneously both systemic reform and economic development, 
rather than systemic reform alone. Clearly, this statement suggests that economic 
development is by no means a natural or easy process. This message is a basic tenet of what 
has been termed, somewhat grandiosely, ‘the post-Washington consensus’. 
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 In terms of the immediate causes of economic growth, it might well be true that 
China’s growth pattern in the 1980s and 1990s is not really unusual compared with the wider, 
underdeveloped world as a whole in the second half of the twentieth century. Three general 
observations pertaining to the worldwide experience of late development are of note. These, 
namely, are: first, late development is often associated with the process of industrialisation, in 
the form of an increasing share of employment of resources and production of output by 
industry in the economy; second, there exists a positive relationship between output and 
productivity growth within the industrial sector; and, third, there also exists a positive 
relationship between industrial growth on the one hand, and the output or productivity growth 
of the rest of the economy on the other hand.8  
China’s real growth rate of industrial value-added reached 11.1% per annum in the 
1980s, and increased further to the rate of 13.7% per annum in the 1990s. These rates are 
much higher than the average of all low-income economies meanwhile, 5.5% and 2.7%, 
respectively for the two periods, as well as that of all middle-income economies, 3.6% and 
3.9%, respectively. They are also substantially higher than the average of the East Asian high-
growing economies (including China itself), the star performers of the underdeveloped world, 
where the average annual growth rates during these two periods are both 9.3%. No wonder, 
therefore, China’s overall economic growth in the 1980-90s has far outstripped most parts of 
the underdeveloped world. Figure 1 charts out the evolution of labour productivity of Chinese 
industry relative to the rest of the economy, both in nominal and real terms. It can be seen that 
                                                           
8 These observations are known in the literature as the ‘Kaldorian stylised facts’, while the 
interpretation attached to them by Nicholas Kaldor is known as ‘the Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws’ 
(N. Kaldor, Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth in the United Kingdom, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966. See also J.S.L. McCombie and A.P. Thirlwall, Economic 
Growth and the Balance-of-Payment Constraint, London: Macmillan, 1994.) It is noted that, 
whilst the interpretation has been a matter of debate, the observations themselves have been 
largely a consensus in the literature. See M. Syrquin, ‘Structural transformation and the new 
growth theory’ (in L.L. Pasinetti and R.M. Solow [eds.] Economic Growth and the Structure 
of Long−Term Development, London: Macmillan, 1994). 
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the curve representing relative labour productivity at constant prices has been persistently 
above that representing relative labour productivity at current prices. This indicates the 
transfer of productivity gains in the industrial sector to the rest of the economy via changes in 
relative prices, thereby propelling overall economic growth. Moreover, the fact that the gap 
between the two curves has tended to widen over time implies that the pace of productivity 
transfer has tended to accelerate. It is thus clear that, regarding the immediate dynamics of 
economic growth, the Chinese experience over the reform era is industry-led growth.9 
[Figure 1] 
 
3. The Role of External Factors: Causation or Correlation? 
 
It is necessary to go beyond the immediate dynamics of economic growth (which is common 
to experiences of late development) to investigate the underlying, structural-institutional 
causes of the dynamics (which could be China-specific). In view of the relevant literature on 
industry-led growth, and on the ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws’ indicated above, it is often posited 
that productivity growth in an economy is typically generated by the interaction between 
particular structural-institutional arrangements and the demand environment – the two aspects 
                                                           
9 In the spirit of the  ‘Kaldorian stylised facts’ indicated above, simple regression analyses of 
China’s 1978-2004 data give the following results: 
 Gn = 5.558     +   0.204 Gi   Adjusted-R2 = 0.112 
                               (2.041**) 
 Qi = 0.466      +   0.783 Gi   Adjusted-R2 = 0.388 
                              (4.107***) 
 Qn = -0.369    +   0.492 Gi   Adjusted-R2 = 0.258 
                               (3.110***) 
where, G and Q denote the real annual growth rate of output and labour productivity, 
respectively; the subscripts i and n denote industry and non-industry, respectively; and figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics, with*, ** and *** indicating significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
confidence interval, respectively. It can be seen that China’s growth pattern in the reform era 
fits well with the three stylised facts. 
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combine to form a particular path of economic growth. Hence, further investigation into the 
dynamics of China’s economic growth needs to take as its point of departure the following 
question: what is the source of demand that has underpinned Chinese industrialisation over 
the reform era? It is noted that, on the world scale during this period, a main factor that has 
impeded late industrialisation comes precisely from demand-side constraints.10 Also recall 
that China’s rapid industrial growth has been achieved in the context of starting in the late 
1970s with one of the highest industry-to-GDP ratios in the world. There must exist some 
peculiarities with China’s economic growth path in the reform era such that the accelerating 
pace of industrialisation has found its necessary demand conditions. 
A popular answer from the orthodox establishment to the demand question is to focus 
on the external dynamics of China’s economic transformation, that is, to put the emphasis on 
the country’s very fast expansion in exports in the reform era. It is posited that China has 
followed the path of labour-intensive, export-oriented industrialisation on the basis of its 
(endowment-determined) comparative advantage, which is in turn posited to be manifestation 
of the ‘natural path of development’. If it is further posited that China’s export-oriented sector 
is precisely its market-conforming sector, then, once again, the two orthodox propositions 
described earlier are as if being preserved.11 
There are serious problems with this view, however. In the first place, it begs the 
question as to why such a presumably easy process of export-led growth has not occurred in 
the wider underdeveloped world in a period known as globalisation. Concerning the actual 
                                                           
10 Ajit Singh (‘The actual crisis of economic development’) analyses the slowdown in late 
industrialisation with an emphasis on the worsened demand conditions after the Golden Age. 
Lance Taylor and C. Rada  (‘Can the poor countries catch up? Sources of growth accounting 
give weak convergence for the early 21st Century’, The Schwartz Working Papers no.2003-4, 
http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/publications/workingpapers/index.htm, CEPA, New School 
University, 2003) provides a more recent analysis along the same line of arguments. 
11 World Bank, World Development Report (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, ch.9). 
See also N.R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 2002, ch.2-4). 
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Chinese experience, it also appears to be dubious to claim that the economic growth is export-
led and that it is easy. At one level, according to national income accounting identities, what 
counts as a constituent of aggregate demand is net exports, not gross exports. As can be seen 
from Figure 2, in the period from 1978 to 1993 inclusive, there were eight years out of the 
total of 16 where China actually registered trade deficits. And for the eight years that were 
with trade surpluses, the ratios of net exports to GDP vary from 0.02% to 2.90%. It is only 
from 1994 onwards that China has registered persistent trade surpluses. Even then, the ratios 
of net exports to GDP have remained rather low, reaching 3.86% at their highest. Given the 
low net exports-to-GDP ratios in most parts of the reform era and even in recent years, it is an 
exaggeration to claim that exports have served as the main source of demand for China’s 
economic growth. Such a judgement is unlikely to be significantly altered even if one takes 
into account possible crowding-in effects of exports on the expansion of the other two 
components of aggregate demand, i.e., consumption and investment.12 
                                                           
12  In line with our exposition on China’s dynamics of industry-led growth, the discussion 
here focuses on the impact of exports expansion on economic growth by means of propelling 
demand expansion. Theoretically, there could be other channels through which exports impact 
on growth. In particular, it is often posited in the development literature that exports 
expansion could promote the improvement in allocative and productive efficiency of domestic 
industry via the pressure of competition in the world market (Andrea Boltho, ‘Was Japanese 
growth export-led?’, Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, vol. 48, 415-432, reviews the main 
theories of export-led growth). Viewed even in this broader perspective, Chinese experience 
over the reform era still does not clearly appear to be a case of export-led growth. Simple 
regression analyses of China’s 1978-2004 data give the following results: 
        y  =   -0.076     –     0.002 x                Adjusted-R2 = -0.041 
                                      (-0.089) 
        y   =   -0.114    +    0.008 x       –    0.335 l     +    0.658 k Adjusted-R2 = 0.022 
                                      (0.303)              (-0.949)         (1.255) 
 (N/Y)n   =   -0.268    –    0.117 x       +    0.626 l     +     0.728 k Adjusted-R2 = 0.184 
                                     (-2.890***)        (1.116)           (0.874) 
where, Y, X, L, and K are GDP, exports, labour employment, and value of the capital stock, 
respectively, with lower-case letters denoting the real annual growth rate of the corresponding 
variables. It can be seen from the first regression result that the correlation between exports 
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[Figure 2] 
At another level, meanwhile, the claim that China’s export expansion has been largely 
based on its ‘given’ (endowment-determined) comparative advantage, and hence must be 
easy, should also be viewed with serious suspicion. One counter indicator, presented in Table 
2 above, concerns the proportion of high-tech products in total manufacturing exports: in 
2003, for instance, the ratio was 27% for China, which is higher than India (5%), Brazil 
(12%), Russia (19%), and the average of all middle-income economies (21%). This ratio for 
China is rather close to that of South Korea (32%), the latter being generally recognised as a 
mature industrial economy. Yet, apart from India, all these economies are with much higher 
levels of per capita income, and hence much lower degrees of ‘labour abundance’ or ‘capital 
shortage’, than China. Conversely, it becomes difficult for China’s expansion in high-tech 
exports to be explained by the theory of ‘given’ international comparative advantage. 
In fact, in relation to the expanding high-tech exports is the large and very rapidly 
expanding share of electronic products in China’s total manufacturing exports, from 6% in 
1988 to around 36% by 2004 (data from the website of China’s Ministry of Commerce). In 
terms of production characteristics, it can be shown that the electronics industry has a level of 
per worker output value that is normally twice as high the average of Chinese industry. Yet, it 
is customary in trade analysis to characterise industries with a value of relative labour 
productivity exceeding unity as capital- and technology-intensive. In other words, a large and 
rapidly expanding share of Chinese exports simply does not accord with the country’s ‘given’ 
comparative advantage. The point to note from these indicators of Chinese exports is that the 
performance is not really an automatic, natural outcome of the regulation of the world market. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
growth and economic growth is statistically insignificant. The same applies to the correlation 
between exports growth and productivity improvement, as can be seen from the second 
regression result. Finally, in the case of the third regression where the equation is constructed 
in a way to exclude the spurious effect of the national income accounting identity Y ≡ C + I + 
G + X - M = N + X, (where C, I, G, and M are consumption, investment, government 
expenditure and imports, respectively), it is found that the correlation between exports growth 
and economic growth becomes statistically significant – but the correlation is negative.  
 13 
It must be part of – rather than being the cause of – the overall dynamics of Chinese 
industrialisation.13 
 The above points appear to remain valid even if one goes one step further to take into 
account the role of foreign capital in China’s economic transformation. It is often alleged that 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI), the hitherto main form of foreign capital utilisation in 
China, has in a very significant measure contributed to the country’s economic development – 
in the form of the addition to capital formation, the transfer of better technology and 
management practices, the promotion of structural and institutional changes in the direction of 
raising the efficiency of the economy, etc. Further, there is the oft-highlighted observation 
that a significant and rapidly expanding share of Chinese exports has been accounted for by 
foreign capital invested enterprises (FIEs). Based on these beliefs, allegations and 
observations, there has come out the assertion that China’s economic growth has been to a 
large extent driven by the inflows of foreign capital and the operations of FIEs.14 
                                                           
13 Dic Lo and Thomas Chan (‘Machinery and China’s nexus of foreign trade and economic 
growth’, Journal of International Development, 1998, vol.10, no.6, pp.733-749) analyse the 
implications of China’s massive expansion in the export of mechanical and electronic 
products since the mid-1980s, and argue that these exports have largely leapfrogged over the 
country’s ‘given’ comparative advantage. Masao Yoshitomi (‘The comparative advantage of 
China’s manufacturing in the twenty-first century’, in OECD [ed.] China in the 21st Century: 
Long-Term Global Implications, Paris: OECD, 1996) gives a similar assessment: ‘China has 
revealed comparative advantage vis-à-vis ASEAN countries in capital- and technology-
intensive products despite a similar development stage and even lower per-capita income. 
China’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive and natural resource-based products is 
essentially in relation to advanced countries and NIEs [newly industrialising economies], not 
ASEAN countries. However, it is also interesting to note that over the past ten years, China 
has been gaining comparative advantage relative to NIEs (in a broad range of technology- and 
capital-intensive industries).’ See also Dani Rodrik, ‘What’s so special about China’s 
exports?’ (Kennedy School, Harvard University, 2006, http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik). 
14 See, e.g., J-C. Berthélemy and S. Démurger, ‘Foreign direct investment and economic 
growth: theory and application to China’ (Review of Development Economics, 2000, vol.4, 
no.2, pp.140-155), and W. Tseng and H. Zebregs, ‘Foreign direct investment in China: some 
lessons for other countries’ (IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/3, 2002, www.imf.org). 
 14 
 The main problem with this orthodoxy-inspired assertion is that it does not fare well 
with the observable realities. Consider, first, the addition to capital formation brought about 
by foreign direct investment. As a ratio to gross fixed capital formation, FDI flows were of 
small magnitudes from 1979 to 1991. Massive increases do have occurred from 1992, with 
the ratio averaging to around 14% for ten years until 2004. This ratio is roughly twice as high 
the average for all developing countries. Nevertheless, because they were only a fraction of 
gross fixed capital formation, and the latter was in turn only a fraction of GDP, FDI flows 
could not account for a significant part of China’ economic growth. A similar judgement can 
be made regarding the contribution to export earnings by FIEs. True that FIEs have accounted 
for a rapidly expanding share of China’s total exports, exceeding 40% from 1996 and 50% 
from 2001 to reach 57% in 2004. Yet, it is also true that FIEs have accounted for an even 
larger share of total imports, staying at the level of 58% even by 2004. For 13 years from 
1985 to 1997, FIEs ran sizeable foreign trade deficits every year, quite in contrast to China’s 
overall trade surplus meanwhile. And, although FIEs have enjoyed trade surplus every year 
from 1998, such surplus has accounted for only a minor part of the national total. 
 What about the unobservable contribution of foreign capital? It is widely believed, 
and inferred from regression analyses, that FDI flows and the operations of FIEs have raised 
the efficiency of the Chinese economy – through such mechanisms as technology transfer, 
and the promotion of structural and institutional changes. But, again, this belief does not seem 
to fare well with the reality as a whole; and, insofar as the indicated inference does have its 
empirical backing, there is always a serious question of distinguishing correlation from 
causation (in the dictionary, not statistical, meaning of the term). 
In this connection, it is of interest to note the contrast in productivity performance 
between the industries of the two main centres of China’s FDI utilisation: Guangdong 
province vis-à-vis the Shanghai region (i.e., Shanghai municipality plus Jiangsu province). In 
2003, the share of FIEs in the value-added of all local industrial enterprises was 59% for 
Guangdong province and 42% for the Shanghai region, compared with the level of 28% in 
China as a whole. It is well-known that Guangdong’s economic development has followed a 
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path of labour-intensive, export-oriented industrialisation, in line with the principle of 
comparative advantage. It is also well-known that the Shanghai region has followed a 
development path that is in the opposite direction, i.e., inward-looking, capital-deepening 
industrialisation. Now, it can be seen from Table 3 that, from 1991 to 2004, the labour 
productivity of Guangdong relative to the national average decreased substantially while that 
of the Shanghai region saw a modest increase. These reflect their opposite industrialisation 
paths: relative to the national average, Guangdong industry has become more labour-intensive 
whereas Shanghai industry has become more capital- and technology-intensive. Yet, Table 3 
also shows that, relative to the national average, the total factor productivity of Guangdong 
industry also decreased substantially whereas that of the Shanghai region again registered a 
modest increase. Taken together, these observations imply that, insofar as FDI has indeed 
been positively correlated to productivity growth, this has tended to be limited to such context 
wherein the development paths deviate from the principle of the market.  
[Table 3] 
Similar analyses of the relative productivity performance of industrial sectors in the 
country as a whole reinforce this point. There is no clear pattern of FIEs-dominated sectors 
having outperformed the rest of Chinese industry in terms of total factor productivity growth; 
and, for those FIEs-dominated sectors that have indeed had better-than-average performance, 
they have tended to be capital- and technology-intensive. It appears that FDI has been drawn 
into these sectors mainly because of dynamic factors, i.e., the potential for rapid productivity 
growth and/or demand-side considerations. Conversely, insofar as FDI is correlated to 
productivity improvement in the Chinese industries and regions, this is likely to be a matter of 
cumulative rather than unidirectional causation. Just like the relationship between exports 
expansion and economic growth, the positive contribution of FDI is part of – rather than 
being the cause of – the overall dynamics of the Chinese economy.15 
                                                           
15 Dic Lo, ‘Assessing the role of foreign direct investment in China’s economic development’ 
(Economics Department working paper, SOAS, London, September 2003, 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/departments/departmentinfo.cfm?navid=437); revised February 2006. 
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On the whole, from the discussion above on the economic impact of foreign trade and 
FDI flows, it seems reasonable to draw the following two conclusions concerning the role of 
the external dynamics in China’s economic transformation. First, in aggregate terms, the role 
of the external dynamics is found to be modest. It is found that net exports as a source of 
aggregate demand and FDI as an addition to gross fixed capital formation have both been 
small in magnitude. Second, in the structural sense of industrial upgrading and of raising the 
efficiency of the economy, the role of the external dynamics cannot be clearly delineated but 
is unlikely to be in line with the orthodox notion of the ‘natural path of development’. The 
positive impact of the external dynamics in this second respect is found to be part of, rather 
than being the cause of, the overall dynamics of the Chinese economy. In other words, the 
external dynamics is to a significant extent generated by China’s domestic factors, rather than 
being the natural outcome of the logic of the world market. 
Viewed from the perspective of worldwide late development, the Chinese model of 
economic development has thus exhibited both similarities and differences compared with the 
canonical ‘East Asian model’ of industrialisation as delineated by a number of renowned, 
non-orthodox exponents. On the similarity side, writers like Alice Amsden and Robert Wade, 
on the basis of their studies of the East Asian experiences, have forcefully argued that late 
industrialisation requires the building up of sophisticated production capability, which is not 
at all an easy task. And scholars that apply this theory to study Chinese industrialisation have 
come out with the conclusion that what is required for successful late development is not just 
production capability as such but rather the building up of indigenous innovative capability, 
indeed of an indigenous ‘national system of innovation’.16 On the difference side, meanwhile, 
                                                           
16 Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989, ch.1); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory 
and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1990, concluding chapters). Qiwen Lu, China’s Leap into the Information 
Age: Innovation and Organization in the Computer Industry (New York: Oxford University 
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it appears that Chinese industrialisation is much less than its East Asian counterpart in relying 
on the external, world market as its source of demand and productivity growth. The external 
dynamics has played a comparatively less important role in the Chinese case. 
 
4. The Internal Dynamics: the Demand Question and the Growth Paths 
 
Thus, any convincing account of China’s industry-led economic growth necessarily requires 
an explicit analysis of the internal dynamics. Recall that from Figure 2 it was clearly evident 
that, of China’s aggregated demand, consumption accounted for a substantially bigger share 
in 1978-1992 than in 1993-2004. The opposite was true for the share of aggregate demand 
accounted for by investment. Corresponding to this change in the composition of demand is 
the evolution of the level of industrial labour productivity relative to the rest of the economy, 
shown in Figure 1. In the first half of the reform era, industrial growth (and hence overall 
economic growth) was to a large extent propelled by the transfer of unskilled labour from the 
rural-agricultural sector to the more productive industrial sector. This exerted downward 
pressures on industrial relative labour productivity. Since the early 1990s, however, industrial 
development has followed a new path that is characterised by ‘capital deepening’. Industrial 
relative labour productivity has tended to rise, and at an accelerating pace. And the share of 
industrial labour employment in the national total has stagnated, in contrast to the persistent 
increases in the 1978-1992 period. Clearly, there was a fundamental break in the early 1990s 
whereby Chinese economic growth shifted from consumption-led to investment-led, and from 
‘industrial widening’ to ‘capital deepening’.  
[Figure 3] 
 In this connection, for analysing the demand question in China’s economic growth, it 
would be illuminating to follow a recurring thesis of Post-Keynesian (and arguably Marxian) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Press, 2000); William Lazonick, ‘Indigenous innovation and economic development: lessons 
from China’s Leap into the Information Age’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Business History Conference, Lowell, Massachusetts, 28 June 2003. 
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macroeconomics in focusing on income distribution. The starting point concerns the evolution 
of the structure of Chinese industry. As can be seen from Table 4, in the first half of the 
reform era and more conspicuously in the second half, a prominent feature of the evolution is 
the rapid expansion of the output share of heavy manufacturing industries, along with the 
shrinkage of extraction industries and light industries that use farm products as raw materials 
(particularly the industrial sectors of textile, clothing and leather products). A closer look at 
the evolution further reveals that it is the broad machinery sector, particularly the electronics 
industry, that has had the biggest gain in output share. 
[Table 4] 
 This seems unusual. For, traditionally, it is a notorious character of the Soviet-type 
centrally planned system that the machinery sector plays a leading role in the economy. In the 
case of China, by 1980, the sector had already expanded to the extent of accounting for up to 
23% of the total output of Chinese industry. Does the further expansion of the sector in the 
reform era, therefore, signify a continuation of the Soviet-type Feldman-Mahalanobis model 
of economic growth – that is, a growth path that is based on ‘producing investment goods for 
producing investment goods’ (or, in short, ‘producing machines for producing machines’)? In 
view of the actual situation, and of our preceding discussion on the inferences from Figures 1 
and 2, the answer appears to be ‘no’ for the first half of the reform era and probably ‘yes’ for 
the second half.  
 In the first half of the reform era, the massive expansion of the machinery sector (and 
light industries using non-farm products as inputs) was actually associated with a phenomenal 
development that was felt by the entire Chinese population: the ‘consumption revolution’ 
signified by the explosive growth of a very wide range of consumer durables, ranging from 
electrical and electronic home appliances in the 1980s to mobile phones, personal computers 
and the like in the 1990s. These products are not investment goods, but they do belong to the 
mechanical and electronics industry. It was the explosive growth of these new consumer 
durables that accounted for the expansion of the machinery sector in the 1978-1992 period. 
And the machinery sector was the main driving force behind the growth of Chinese industry 
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as whole, as well as the transfer of productivity gains from industry to the rest of the economy 
via changes in relative prices and other mechanisms.17 
 In terms of technical and economic characteristics, the new consumer durables belong 
to mass-production industries that are characterised by rapid technological change, extensive 
backward and forward linkages and high income elasticity of demand. Their explosive growth 
in the first half of the reform era was thus sustained by the existence of mass consumption in 
the domestic market. More generally, it may be argued that China’s rapid economic growth in 
the 1978-1992 period was based on a nexus of causal relationships that could be characterised 
as the following: consumption induced investment and thus overall demand expansion, 
thereby making it possible to absorb labour transfer from agriculture and to improve industrial 
productivity via dynamic increasing returns. In other words, there was a virtuous circle 
between consumption and production, and between industry and the economy. This 
characterisation of the fundamental dynamics of China’s economic growth path is consistent 
with the three features of the Chinese economy indicated earlier: namely, the direction of 
structural change associated with the ‘consumption revolution’, the leading role of industry in 
economic growth in line with ‘Kaldor’s stylised facts’, and the judgement that the external 
dynamics (the positive impacts of foreign trade and FDI flows) is mostly a consequence 
rather than a cause of the characterised internal dynamics. 
 The dynamics or nexus of causal relationships of China’s economic growth over the 
first half of the reform era, characterised above, presupposes the existence of two necessary 
conditions. First, the process of structural change, which was the main driving force of  
economic growth, involved both a rapid expansion of the share of industry in the economy 
and the leading role of a wide range of new, consumer durables industries. The former aspect 
corresponds to the trend of labour transfer from agriculture to industry, and hence improving 
                                                           
17 Dic Lo, China’s Transformational Growth: A Structural-Institutional Analysis (in Chinese) 
(Beijing: Economic Science Press, 2001) ch.3-4 analyses in details the role of the machinery 
sector, particularly the expansion of the indicated new consumer durables, in the dynamics of 
Chinese industrialisation and economic growth. 
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allocative efficiency, while the second aspect corresponds to the ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws’ of 
improving industrial productivity via dynamics increasing returns. Second, there must exist an 
even, egalitarian pattern of income distribution, which underpins mass-consumption, thereby 
inducing investment and overall demand expansion. By income distribution it covers the total 
of both money and non-money incomes for Chinese people, particularly for urban residents in 
the first half of the reform era. The degree of egalitarianism is thus difficult to be gauged by 
conventional measures of income distribution such as the Gini index. Perhaps much more 
appropriate measures would be social development indicators such as life expectancy at birth, 
the infant mortality rate, and the adult illiteracy rate. It is well-known that, in these measures, 
China’s performance in the late 1970s was very close to the average of all middle-income 
economies in the world, in spite that it was a low-income economy. By the early years of the 
Twenty-First century, China’s performance in the social development indicators remained 
very close to the average of all middle-income economies, despite the fact that its economic 
growth in the preceding two decades had far outstripped the rest of the developing world. 
Overall, it would be appropriate to assert that, for the main part of the reform era, China’s 
pattern of income distribution tended to be egalitarian by international standard – although it 
is also true that egalitarianism tended to wither along with the market reform. 
 It was precisely the worsening of the pattern of income distribution under the market 
reform that led to the fundamental shift of China’s growth path in the early 1990s. Though not 
a very good measure, the Gini index does broadly indicate the trend of worsening income 
distribution. In 1978, the value of the Gini index in China was 0.16 for urban households and 
0.21 for rural households, both being rather low in international comparison. By 1992, the 
value increased to a moderate level of 0.25 for urban households and a high level of 0.31 for 
rural households. By the year 2000, the value rose to high levels for both set of households: 
0.32 urban, 0.35 rural.18 In this context, from the early 1990s until the present time, the 
                                                           
18 Data from Li Shi et. al., A Positive Analysis of Income Distribution in China, (in Chinese) 
(Beijing, Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000) and Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 9th 
July 2002. 
 21 
leading position of consumption has been taken over by investment in sustaining economic 
growth on the demand side. This resulted in the accelerating pace of ‘capital deepening’ in the 
path of economic growth, indicated in Figure 1. In contrast to the first half of the reform era, 
the contribution of the effect of labour transfer to economic growth – that is, the improvement 
in allocative efficiency as a source of productivity growth – has tended to be weakened. What 
has been of increasing importance is dynamic increasing returns within industry. 
 Conceptually, in the relevant theoretical literature, it is often posited that dynamics 
increasing returns are not determined by technical factors alone. Neo-Schumpeterian theory of 
innovations rather posits that dynamic increasing returns are typically determined by the 
interaction between technical factors and economic conditions, with the latter being referred 
to the demand environment plus the nature of the institutions involved. Demand-induced 
productivity growth typically takes the form of learning-by-doing effects, the inducement of 
investment for technological renovation and upgrading, and the deepening of the division of 
labour in the economy as a whole – the effects of collective learning, in short. And the nature 
of the economic institutions involved is discernible in their capability of taking advantage of 
the demand conditions to generate collective learning. More concretely, institutional attributes 
that are consistent with collective learning entail the requirement of rigidities – that is, long-
term-oriented relationships between major economic agents, particularly the finance-industry 
and firm-employees relationships. These attributes are antithetical to the logic of allocative 
efficiency, whose realisation requires flexibilities, particularly the free movements of finance 
in the pursuit of high profitability. Post-Keynesian economics, similar to the Marxian notion 
of ‘productive activities’, tends to posit that dynamic increasing returns are mostly restricted 
to the manufacturing sector. This implies that its focus is on the purely technical dimension. 
Even the ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws’, which represent an attempt to combine technical factors 
with the demand conditions, appear to be incomplete in analysing the sources of dynamic 
increasing returns. A complete analytical framework would require further incorporating the 
investigation into the relevant institutional attributes and their interaction with the technical 
factors and the demand conditions. 
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 We leave the issue of institutional attributes in China’s economic transformation to be 
analysed in the next section. To close our analysis of structural change and economic growth, 
it is useful to note that, in both Marxian and Post-Keynesian economics, demand expansion is 
normally determined by two sets of factors, exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous factors 
refer to the pattern of income distribution and that of consumption, and underpinning these 
patterns the history-specific political and cultural conditions. Endogenous factors, meanwhile, 
refer to the specificity of the economic growth path in question. More concretely, in Marxian 
economics, the sustainability on the demand side of a growth path based on ‘producing 
machines for producing machines’ is determined by the pace of production innovations. It is 
through production innovations that the variety of investment goods could continuously 
expand, and that the law of diminishing demand may not apply.19 The sources, and pace, of 
product innovations in Chinese economic growth particularly since the early 1990s are an 
important issue wanting scholarly studies. Nevertheless, one point seems clear: in addition to 
domestic generation, a very important source of product innovations is from continuous, large 
scale importing of foreign technology. It is in this particular respect that the external 
dynamics has played a crucial role in China’s overall economic transformation.20 
                                                           
19 Meng Jie, The Innovative Transformation of Marxist Economics’ (in Chinese) (Beijing: 
Economic Science Press, 2001) provides a review and reformulation of the relevant theories, 
particularly on the role of product innovations in the debates surrounding Luxemburg’s theory 
of capital accumulation and Mandel’s theory of the long waves in capitalist development. 
20 Dic Lo and Thomas Chan (‘Machinery…’). In contrast to the relationship between exports 
expansion and economic growth, simple regression analyses of China’s 1978-2004 data of 
imports expansion and economic growth give the following results: 
        y    =    -0.065    +     0.041 m    Adjusted-R2 = 0.082 
                                         (1.795**) 
        y    =   -0.084     +    0.046 m     –    0.497 l     +    0.215 k Adjusted-R2 = 0.139 
                                        (1.760**)        (-1.545*)        (0.389) 
 (R/Y)r     =    0.418      +    0.199 m    +    0.435 l     +    0.408 k Adjusted-R2 = 0.614 
                                        (5.164***)       (0.913)          (0.496) 
where, Y, M, L, and K are GDP, imports, labour employment, and value of the capital stock, 
respectively, with lower-case letters denoting the real annual growth rate of the corresponding 
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5. The Internal Dynamics: the Institutions of Growth 
 
The logical starting point in the nexus of causal relationships underpinning China’s economic 
transformation, as depicted in the preceding section, is the existence of an egalitarian pattern 
of income distribution. This pattern of income distribution has been, in turn, based on China’s 
specific political economy. Throughout the reform era, the economy has been dominated by 
public ownership, and within the publicly-owned sector (especially within state-owned 
enterprises) egalitarianism in distribution has been the norm. By the turn of the century, state-
owned and collectively-owned enterprises still combined to account for two-third of the 
value-added of Chinese industry as a whole, with the rest being accounted for by the catch-all 
category of enterprises of ‘other ownership’ which include private firms, Sino-foreign joint 
ventures and shareholding firms. And, even for shareholding firms that are not formally state-
controlled, a significant proportion (mainly those listed in the stock market) are actually with 
state agents as the ultimate owner-controller. 
 It is thus possible to turn back to view the orthodox establishment’s first proposition 
on China – concerning the nature and attributes of its reformed economic institutions – in 
different light. What it considers as market-supplanting elements of the Chinese economy are 
precisely the egalitarian systemic features, particularly the institutions and behaviour of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The concerned observation is widely agreed: that the institutional 
arrangements of China’s SOEs have been contradicting the principles of the canonical market 
economy, especially individualistic property rights. Conceptually, in the relevant literature, 
China’s enterprise reform has generally been portrayed as a process of the state attempting to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
variables. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics, with*, ** and *** indicating significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% confidence interval, respectively. The equation of the third regression is 
constructed in a way to exclude the spurious effect of the national income accounting identity 
Y ≡ C + I + G + X – M = R – M. In all the three regression results, the correlation between 
imports growth and economic growth is positive and statistically significant.  
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employ and induce entrepreneurial activities of the managerial layer. But, it is noted that this 
process has taken place in a broader context where various stake-holders of enterprises – local 
governments, workers, local communities, the banks and other business partners – have been 
involved to form a web of check and balance governing the operation and development of 
enterprises. This systemic feature is visible not only in SOEs but also in enterprises of other 
types of public ownership, so much so that some from the orthodox establishment have 
dismissively termed the renowned collectively-owned township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) as ‘the second state sector’.21 
 The crucial question, however, is: what are the implications of this rigidity-infused, 
long-term-oriented systemic feature of China’s industrial enterprises with respect to economic 
development? Specifically, even if it is true that this feature has its advantage of underpinning 
the egalitarian pattern of income distribution and mass consumption, as suggested above, has 
it also resulted in – as the orthodox establishment persistently maintains – gross inefficiency 
of enterprise at the micro level? 
Of course, the assertion about the allegedly ailing state sector in China has been so 
popular in Western media that it seems trivial to answer the question. But, in the scholarly 
(rather than journalistic) literature, the assertion has in fact been a matter of debate. The 
debate first centres around the assessment of productivity change of SOEs in the reform era. 
Because of the very different estimation results of total factor productivity growth in SOEs 
obtained by different studies, and because of lacking objective criteria to resolve the 
difference, the orthodox assertion has been but just one, and far from being the dominant one, 
of the established views on the matter. Hence, and against the background of the East Asian 
                                                           
21 For analyses of the institutional attributes of China’s SOEs and TVEs, see, respectively, 
Dic Lo (China’s Transformational Growth, chapters 5-6), and Russell Smyth (‘Township and 
village enterprises in China – growth mechanism and future prospects’, Journal of 
International Economic Studies, 1998, vol.12, pp.101-117). Both studies observe that the 
reformed enterprise system – whether SOEs or TVEs – has exhibited the kind of institutional 
rigidities and long-term orientation that are akin to the canonical Japanese system, and argue 
that this system has embodied the kind of relative efficiency attributes detailed below. 
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financial and economic crisis, the orthodox establishment has shifted to base its assertion on 
the assessment of the financial performance of SOEs. It is claimed that the observed trend of 
declining enterprise profitability, together with the increasing ratio of non-performing loans 
of state-owned banks, are both symptoms of the same ill: the gross inefficiency of SOEs. It is 
further claimed that this must be treated as a matter of urgency, as otherwise an East Asian-
type crisis is most likely to occur in China.22 
 Compared with the second orthodox proposition (on development) indicated earlier in 
the article, this first proposition (on institutions) does not appear to fare better with the reality. 
On the one hand, it is a gross exaggeration to assert that the nexus of SOEs, state-owned 
banks and the state itself as a whole is anything on the verge of a financial crisis. The fact that 
China has survived well the East Asian crisis since 1997 flies in the face of this assertion. To 
the extent that the nexus has indeed accumulated financial problems, they are largely a result 
of the fiscal difficulty of the state rather than enterprise inefficiency. For, over the reform era, 
SOEs have paid all the social costs that should have been the responsibility of state finance. 
They have paid income taxes at much higher rates than other enterprises, while also facing 
serious under-capitalisation from the state-owner. On the other hand, the observed decline of 
enterprise profitability reflects more a macroeconomic issue than microeconomic inefficiency. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the pre-tax profit rate of SOEs has in fact been very close to the 
average of all enterprises: slightly higher in the 1980s and slightly lower in the 1990s, while 
                                                           
22 Representative of the orthodox view on productivity growth are the works by Wing-Thye 
Woo, Wen Hai, Yibiao Jin and Gan Fan (‘How successful has Chinese enterprise reform 
been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1994, vol.18, 
pp.410-437; and, ‘Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng’, China Economic 
Review, 1994, vol.5, pp.243-249). Representative of the dissident view are the works by G.H. 
Jefferson, T.G. Rawski and Yuxing Zheng (‘Growth, efficiency, and convergence in China’s 
state and collective industry’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1992, vol.40, 
pp.239-266; and, ‘Chinese industrial productivity: trends, measurement issues, and recent 
development’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1996, vol.23, pp.146-180). Along the 
orthodox line, the most articulate analysis of the financial aspect of Chinese enterprises is 
N.R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution. 
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both exhibiting a tendency of secular decline up until 1998, and of substantial rebound post-
1998. Noting that China’s accounting system has tended to underestimate depreciation, and 
hence to overestimate the capital stock of SOEs which are in general much older than non-
SOEs, it could be argued that the profit rate of SOEs is likely to have been higher than 
industrial average throughout the reform era.23 
[Figure 4] 
 Figure 4 also shows that, throughout the reform era, the pre-tax profit rate of large-
scale enterprises has been much higher than the industrial average. It can be verified that the 
same applies regarding the comparison of other performance indicators, such as output and 
productivity growth. Given that the vast majority of large-scale enterprises are in fact SOEs – 
that is, they have formed the core of China’s state sector – it appears that the first orthodox 
proposition cannot be farther from the reality. What is more reasonable, therefore, is to see 
how this seemingly paradoxical reality could be made sense. In other words, what kind of 
advantage can be generated by the systemic feature of SOEs, which appears to have more 
than compensated for the (allocative) efficiency loss that is deemed unavoidable from the 
standpoint of orthodox economic theory? 
 It will be recalled that the reformed Chinese enterprise system has been infused with 
rigidities, especially with an emphasis on maintaining a long-term relationship with major 
stake-holders. This is akin to the canonical East Asian, or Japanese, system, and there are 
well-developed economic theories to explain the distinctive advantage and disadvantage of 
systemic features of this kind. Succinctly, in the context of steadily growing market demand, 
                                                           
23 Dic Lo, ‘Reappraising the performance of China’s state-owned industrial enterprises, 1980-
96’ (Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1999, vol.23, pp.693-718) gives an assessment of the 
performance of SOEs, particularly large-scale enterprises, that is in line with the arguments 
presented here. Yuk-shing Cheng and Dic Lo ‘Explaining the financial performance of 
China’s industrial enterprises: beyond the competition-ownership controversy’ (The China 
Quarterly, 2002, no.170, pp.413-440) contend that, even without taking into account social 
burdens, the financial performance of SOEs has been at least comparable to the rest of 
Chinese industry while that of large-scale SOEs has been much better. 
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industrial firms that are infused with rigidities and long-term orientation are especially 
capable of improving productivity via various kinds of dynamic efficiency, particularly 
through collective learning. By contrast, in the context of stagnant or contracting demand, 
firms of this kind have difficulty in adjustment and hence tend to be out-competed by flexible, 
market-conforming and short-term-oriented firms.24  
The above theoretical argument appears to be reasonable for explaining the fact that, 
on existing indicators, China’s SOEs out-competed non-SOEs in the demand-expanding 
1980s but were out-competed in the demand-stagnant 1990s. Conversely, such an explanation 
also pushes to the forefront the most prominent feature of the Chinese ‘model’ of economic 
transformation. This, namely, is the basically appropriate match between mass consumption at 
the macro level and the long-term-oriented behaviour of enterprises at the micro level, and, 
behind this, that between the egalitarian income distribution and the systemic feature of 
enterprises being accountable to major stake-holders. Needless to say, the significance of this 
match is no less than the sustained rapid economic growth itself. It offers the opportunity for 
China to embark on a path of late development that takes a strongly socialist character.25 
                                                           
24 Masahiko Aoki, ‘Toward an economic model of the Japanese firm’ (Journal of Economic 
Literature, 1990, vol.28, pp.1-27), provides a schematic, theoretical exposition on the relative 
efficiency attributes of the (both stylised) Japanese firm vis-à-vis the American firm. Dic Lo 
and Russell Smyth, ‘Towards a re-interpretation of the economics of feasible socialism’, 
(Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2004, vol.28, no.6, pp.791-808), in a similar vein, 
synthesise a range of theories on technological paradigms, growth paths and economic 
institutions to investigate the relative efficiency attributes of different economic systems. 
25 In line with our discussion on sources of productivity growth in the previous sections, an 
analysis of the relative efficiency attributes of SOEs vis-à-vis non-SOEs in the following way 
will be of interest. Recall the Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws state that there exists a positive 
relationship between output growth and productivity growth. In the literature of endogenous 
growth theory, this view has been synthesised with the neo-Schumpeterian proposition that 
productivity growth is the result of interaction between micro institutions and the macro 
demand-side conditions. Hence the following model for analysing the institutional sources of 
productivity growth 
ΔlnPt = a + b(lnPt-1 – clnQt-1) + dΔlnQt 
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But, it is also at this point that the constraints confronted by the pattern of economic 
transformation depicted above are clearly exposed. The introduction of market practices 
might be necessary for the formation of micro-level incentives for economic development, but 
market reforms in the strict sense – that is, principles of individualistic property rights – are 
bound to disrupt the match between the macro environment and the micro institutions detailed 
above. On the macro side, such reforms tend to reduce workers’ income and threaten their job 
security, thereby undermining egalitarian income distribution and mass consumption. On the 
micro side, such reforms threaten the loyalty or long-term commitment of major stake-holders 
(again, workers in particular) to the firm, thus undermining the scope for collective learning. 
The 1995-97 nationwide downsizing drive in state industry is especially crucial in this 
regard. Initiated by the state leadership with an objective of transforming large and medium 
                                                                                                                                                                          
where P and Q are the level of labour productivity and value-added, respectively. It is 
submitted that the coefficient c indicates the long-term relationship between P and Q. The 
term (lnPt-1 – clnQt-1) therefore represents deviation from this relationship in a particular 
period, and b indicates the capability of flexibly adjusting to correct the deviation in the short 
term. The analysis follows a two-step approach: first regressing lnPt-1 on lnQt-1 to obtain c, 
and then regressing ΔlnPt on the residuals of the above together with a and ΔlnQt to obtain b. 
The results of the analysis for Chinese industrial SOEs, for the period 1978-2004, are: 
ΔlnPt = -0.006 - 0.016 (lnPt-1 - 1.158lnQt-1) + 1.303ΔlnQt Adjusted-R2 = 0.581 
               (-0.236)            (14.808)***    (5.836)*** 
And for non-SOEs: 
ΔlnPt = -0.001 - 0.167 (lnPt-1 - 0.786lnQt-1) + 0.739ΔlnQt Adjusted-R2 = 0.628 
               (-1.613)*          (45.864)***    (5.093)*** 
where *** and * indicate 1% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. It can be seen that, 
both for SOEs and non-SOEs, there does exist a long-term relationship between the level of 
productivity and output. And the value of coefficient c, which indicates this relationship, is 
much higher for SOEs (1.158) than for non-SOEs (0.786). Meanwhile, the value of 
coefficient b, which indicates the short-term flexibility for adjustment, is statistically 
significant for non-SOEs (0.167) but not for SOEs (0.016). From these results, it can be 
inferred that SOEs are more capable of generating productivity growth via dynamic 
increasing returns in the context of expanding macro demand, whereas non-SOEs are more 
capable of flexibly adjusting to cope with demand stagnation or fluctuations in the short term. 
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SOEs into modern corporations and small SOEs into shareholding cooperatives, the drive was 
seized upon by many local governments to simply sell off state assets while unilaterally 
defecting on the state’s obligation for the job security of workers (and passing the liabilities of 
the sold enterprises onto state banks and ultimately to the central government). The crux of 
the matter is that, in the context of the demand-stagnant 1990s, SOEs had difficulty in 
utilising the relative efficiency attributes of their rigidity-infused, long-term-oriented 
institutions to generate dynamic increasing returns. They were thus ill-equipped for 
competing with the more market-oriented non-SOEs, as well as transnational corporations 
which began to enter China in massive scales from the early 1990s. The downsizing drive 
launched by local governments, in the form of mass lay-off, further worsened the situation. 
 Consequently, unemployment surged, consumption expansion slowed down further 
and investment growth also stagnated. Together with the worsening external environment 
caused by the East Asian crisis, all these plunged China into a state of deflation at the macro 
level, and worsening financial performance of industrial enterprises at the micro level, in the 
closing years of the century. It was only with a significant policy reversal, where the state 
leadership shifted from the stance of pushing forward the drive of marketisation to forcefully 
implement a range of market-supplanting policies – Keynesian-type fiscal stimuli, welfare-
state measures, policies to revitalise SOEs and state banks, and a cautious approach to 
reforming the regime of external transactions (particularly to shelve the target of liberalising 
the country’s capital account) – that economic growth was sustained in the crisis-prone period 
of 1998-2000.26 
The policy reversal in 1998-2000 did not result in the resumption of the previous 
pattern of economic transformation, however. What has emerged is a new pattern that exhibits 
strong resemblance to the canonical East Asian model of economic institutions and growth. 
                                                           
26 Raymond W.K. Lau, ‘The 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party: milestone in 
China’s privatization’ (Capital and Class, 1999, no.68, pp.51-87) provides a detailed analysis 
of the 1995-97 enterprise downsizing and privatisation drive. Dic Lo, (‘China after East Asian 
developmentalism’) analyses the significance of the policy reversal in 1998-2000. 
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At one level, the path of industrialisation characterised by capital deepening has become 
firmly established, with the pace of capital deepening tending to accelerate. This is largely 
due to the fact that consumption expansion has continued to be sluggish, and its leading 
position has been taken over by investment. Hence the characteristic of ‘producing machines 
for producing machines’. Meanwhile, at another level, consistent with capital deepening and 
economic growth based on increasing returns is the rapid expansion of large-scale enterprises: 
their value-added share in Chinese industry as a whole increased from 27% in 1998 to 36% in 
2002. This is somewhat ironical, as it occurred in a period when, on the world scale and 
particularly from the orthodox establishment, there was widespread criticism on the East 
Asian model of capital-deepening industrialisation carried out by large-scale industrial 
conglomerates – the model dismissively termed as ‘crony capitalism’. 
This new pattern of economic transformation is clearly different from that of the first 
half of the reform era. There is no trace of existing an appropriate match between egalitarian 
income distribution and a systemic feature of enterprises being accountable to major stake-
holders. True that, along with capital deepening and the indicated policy reversal, there has 
witnessed a phenomenal revival of the state sector. The value-added share of SOEs in Chinese 
industry increased from 33% in 1998 to 35% in 2002 and further to 37% in 2004, amid the 
rebound of their profit rate to once again surpass the industrial average. Yet, in an institutional 
sense, this revival has been more than outweighed by the massive decrease in the employment 
share of SOEs in Chinese industry: it decreased from 38% in 1998 to 21% in 2004. And this 
reflects the broader trend of shrinking employment share of the public sector in the Chinese 
society as a whole. As can be seen from Table 5, of the total of urban employment, the 
combined share of state-owned and collectively-owned units decreased from 76% in 1995 to 
29% in 2004. In the rural areas, the employment share of the collective township-village 
enterprises remained basically unchanged during this period, in contrast to the persistent 
increase in the first half of the reform era. Surely, a society where the main part of labour 




6. Speculation over the Future Prospects 
 
In the discussion so far, we have left untouched a dimension that is conceivably of enormous 
importance in explaining the actual experience of China’s economic transformation: namely, 
politics. Ultimately, the inquiry into the role of politics comes down to answering the 
following question: if the pattern of economic transformation in the first half of the reform era 
has proved to be very successful in underpinning the sustained rapid economic growth, why 
has it been progressively abandoned from the early 1990s onwards? In particular, why did the 
Chinese state unfailingly pursue the policies of marketisation? An adequate answer to these 
questions would require analysing such fundamental issues as the changing social formation 
and class relations – defined, to be rigorous, in the Marxian sense in relation to the 
‘economic’ matters discussed in this article – in China, as well as the changing relationship 
between China (‘socialism in one country’) and the capitalist world system. These issues are 
really too big to be dealt with in the article. 
 Nevertheless, it might still be possible and useful to attempt a less deep-going answer 
to the indicated questions by looking at the ‘agents’, rather than ‘structures’, in China’s social 
formation. Recall that what have most fundamentally undermined the depicted pattern of 
economic transformation are the 1995-97 enterprise downsizing or privatisation drive, 
together with the process of financial liberalisation in 1993-95. From these developments, it 
could be posited that, to an extent, the Chinese state authorities have been captured by the 
newly emerged financial interests in the economy. By extension, it can be said that the power 
relations in the Chinese society has been to some extent dominated by agents of the 
accumulating speculative capital. Yet, the fact that the Chinese state leadership turned to 
adopt the wide range of market-supplanting policies in the 1998-2000 period suggests that the 
indicated capture and dominance are far from absolute or unconstrained.  
More generally, the character of the new pattern of economic transformation that has 
emerged since the early 1990s and has become firmly established towards the end of the 
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century implies that the Chinese state, while lessening its socialist commitments, has turned to 
strengthening developmental concerns (to retain control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy and thereby to direct the path of overall development, in line with the canonical East 
Asian model) rather than to embracing the free market doctrines in toto. Entering the new 
century, there are signs that the new leadership have even attempted to reinstate the 
importance of socialist concerns in the actual process of economic transformation – as is 
especially evident in the slogan of constructing a ‘harmonious society’ and policies associated 
with this slogan. All these suggest that, in the face of the deadly threat to late development 
caused by financial expansion across the globe, Chinese political economy on the whole is 
unlikely to be subdued by the logic of speculative financial capital, domestic or international. 
In line with the East Asian model of development, China is likely to stick to the logic of 
production rather than that of exchange (let alone that of speculation). Globalisation, then, 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
China 
2.9 3.7 8.8 9.3 6.8 7.6 8.7 8.9 
India 
1.1 2.3 3.6 4.2 3.5 2.6 7.1 5.5 
South Korea 
6.0 8.4 7.7 4.7 3.1 6.3 2.5 4.2 
Brazil 
2.6 6.5 0.7 1.3 0.0 0.7 -0.7 4.0 
USSR/Russia 
4.0 4.7 1.3 -4.7 5.6 5.2 7.8 7.6 
Low-income economies (excluding. 
China and India) 
2.0 1.8 2.2 1.2 2.6 2.4 5.4 4.5 
Middle-income economies 
3.5 2.1 1.2 2.2 1.6 2.3 4.2 6.1 
Low- and middle-income economies 
  1.3 1.8 1.5 2.0 4.1 5.6 
    East Asia and Pacific 
  5.9 5.7 5.1 6.3 7.3 7.7 
    Europe and Central Asia 
  1.2 -1.7 2.0 5.3 5.8 7.0 
    Latin America and Caribbean 
  -0.3 1.7 -1.3 -2.3 0.5 4.6 
    Middle East and North Africa 
  -1.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 3.4 3.4 
    South Asia 
  3.4 3.7 2.8 2.7 6.1 5.1 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 
  -1.3 -0.1 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.4 
High-income economies 
  2.7 2.2 0.4 0.8 1.7 2.8 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report and World Development Indicators, various years. 






Table 2. China’s Level of Industrialisation in International Comparison 
 
Share of industrial value-






Share of high-tech 
products in total 
manufacturing 
exports (%) 
 1980 2000 2003 2001 2000 2003 
China 
49 50 52 89 19 27 
India 
24 27 27 77 5 5 
South Korea 
40 36 35 91 35 32 
Brazil 
44 28 19 54 19 12 
USSR/Russia 
54 38 34 22 14 19 
Low-income economies (excluding 
China and India) 
32 27 27 52 4 4 
Middle-income economies 
41 36 … 61 18 20 
Low- and middle-income 
economies 
… 36 35 … 17 19 
    East Asia and Pacific 
42 48 49 80 31 33 
    Europe and Central Asia 
… 33 31 56 10 12 
    Latin America and Caribbean 
40 29 27 49 15 14 
    Middle East and North Africa 
53 35 37 14 2 3 
    South Asia 
24 26 26 78 4 4 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 
39 30 31 33 4 … 
High-income economies 
37 28 … 82 25 18 











































































Notes: Y = GDP and its components at current prices, with *denoting data at 1978 constant prices. L 
= total labour employment. The subscripts i and n denotes the secondary sector (i.e., industry 
plus construction) and the rest of the Chinese economy, respectively. 
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Table 3. Relative Performance of Industries in Guangdong and Shanghai-Jiangsu 
 1991 2004 change 
Relative labour productivity    
    Guangdong 1.576 0.969 -0.607 
    Shanghai-Jiangsu 1.179 1.275 0.096 
Relative total factor productivity    
    Guangdong 1.417 1.100 -0.317 
    Shanghai-Jiangsu 1.220 1.242 0.022 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], various issues; Zhongguo Gongye Jingji 
Tongji Nianjian [China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook], various issues. 
Notes:   Figures are labour productivity  and total factor productivity (TFP) levels relative to Chinese industry 
as a whole. TFP is calculated as TFP = Q/[(L0.6)(K0.4)], where Q is net value of industrial output or 

























Notes: A = Secondary Sector, B = Primary Sector, C = Tertiary Sector. 







Table 4. Structural Change in Chinese Industry 
 (a) 1980 (b) 1991 (c) 2002 (b)-(a) (c)-(b) (c)-(a) 
Light Industry – using farm products 27.62 28.79 24.61 1.17 -4.19 -3.01 
Light Industry – using non-farm products 12.54 14.41 12.83 1.87 -1.58 0.29 
    Textile, Clothing and Leather Industry 14.95 11.51 8.40 -3.44 -3.10 -6.54 
Heavy Industry – Extraction 11.00 9.40 9.87 -1.60 0.47 -1.13 
Heavy Industry – Materials 24.42 21.79 25.13 -2.63 3.35 0.71 
Heavy Industry – Manufacturing 24.40 25.61 27.57 1.21 1.95 3.16 
    Mechanical & Electronics Industry 22.56 24.37 28.27 1.81 3.90 5.71 
        Electronics Industry 1.64 3.11 7.64 1.47 4.53 6.00 
Sources: China State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook and China Industrial Economics 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Notes: Figures are percentage shares of net industrial output for 1980 and 1991 and of industrial 
value-added for 2002 in the formal sector of Chinese industry, defined as all ‘township-and-
above independently accounting industrial enterprises’ for 1980 and 1991 and ‘all state-owned 
industrial enterprises plus non-state-owned above-designated-scale (of five million yuan in 





























































































































Notes: A = All industrial enterprises (i.e., township-and-above independently accounting industrial 
enterprises for 1997 and before, and all state-owned plus above-scale non-state-owned 
industrial enterprises from 1998). B = state-owned industrial enterprises (including state-
controlled industrial enterprises from 1996). C = large-scale industrial enterprises (data before 
and after 2003 are not fully comparable because of changes in statistical coverage). 






Table 5. Labour Employment (10,000 persons) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Urban total 10525 12808 17041 19040 23151 26476 
    State units 8019 8990 10346 11261 8102 6710 
 (76%) (70%) (61%) (59%) (35%) (25%) 
    Collective units 2425 3324 3549 3147 1499 897 
 (23%) (26%) (21%) (17%) (6%) (3%) 
       
Rural total 31836 37065 47708 49025 48934 48724 
    TVEs 3000 6979 9265 12862 12820 13866 
 (9%) (19%) (19%) (26%) (26%) (28%) 
Sources: China State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentage shares in the relevant sub-totals.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
